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Abstract
In this paper we study a novel setting where firms were randomly allocated differently sized
retail chains in a new and rapidly growing industry. Beginning in 2014, Washington State
used a lottery to allocate licenses to firms in the newly legalized retail cannabis industry. This
lottery generates random variation in firm size and in the level of market concentration. We
also observe detailed data on all subsequent industry transactions, including prices, wholesale
costs, markups, and product assortments. We find that firms that are randomly allocated
more retail store licenses in the lottery ultimately earn much higher per store profits than
single-store firms. Retailers in multi-store chains charge lower margins, offer larger product
assortments, and pay lower wholesale prices. They also face higher but more elastic consumer
demand. Similarly at the market level, more concentrated markets have lower average prices
and markups. We conclude that higher retail scale and a more concentrated retail sector can
benefit consumers and firms alike.
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This paper studies a novel setting where entrepreneurs were randomly allocated differently sized
retail chains in a new and rapidly growing industry. We study the effects of a retail chain’s size on
both its profits and the price and assortment strategies it employs, as well as the effects of market
level concentration on prices and markups.
Firm size is generally considered a key determinant of both firm choices and outcomes in indus-
trial organization, trade, macroeconomics, and finance.1 Despite this, there is very little evidence
on direct causal effects related to firm size because a firm’s size is just one outcome determined
in equilibrium along with many endogenous choices made by firms. A retailer’s size or scale both
cause and are determined by its pricing policies, its assortment choices, its managerial quality, its
capitalization, its set of upstream relationships, its degree of competition with rivals, and so on.
Scale is often taken as an explanatory variable for these types of outcomes despite them all be-
ing determined in a coordinated fashion. We take advantage of a novel natural experiment that
generates direct exogenous variation in firm size to overcome these.
This natural experiment also generates direct exogenous variation in the level of market concen-
tration. There is growing evidence that economy-wide markups have increased over the past few
decades and many have speculated about the role of growing firm size and market concentration in
driving this increase (De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) and De Loecker et al. (2020), Grullon et al.
(2019), Autor et al. (2020)). Nevertheless, there have been few industry specific studies addressing
this issue (Syverson (2019)). This debate suffers from the lack of direct causal evidence on the
relationships between firm size, concentration and markups.
The setting we study is the newly legalized retail cannabis industry in Washington state, which
began in 2014 and features a number of advantages as a laboratory for the study of retail, en-
trepreneurship, firm size, and market concentration. First, the number of new firms allowed to
enter was capped by regulatory design and excess demand for entry licenses by entrepreneurs led
to a lottery to allocate them. Firms could win multiple licenses in this lottery such that two firms
1Choices and outcomes include pricing as we discuss at length but also investment, innovation, tendency to export,
product variety offered, and many others. While much of this research on economies of scale focus on manufacturing
industries, economies of scale in retail have also drawn a great deal of attention, including: Foster et al. (2006),
Foster et al. (2016), Hortacsu and Syverson (2007), Bronnenberg and Ellickson (2015), and Ratchford (2016) who
discuss a number of issues and trends around growing scale in retail. Holmes (2011) and Ellickson et al. (2013)
estimate the cost-side benefits of scale for retail chains. Hosken and Tenn (2016) provides an overview of the issues
in studying merger and consolidation effects in retail. Rhodes (2015), Armstrong et al. (2009), Rhodes and Zhou
(2019), and Moraga-Gonzalez and Petrikaite (2013) provide theoretical studies of consumer search and multiproduct
firm strategy. These studies consider retail consolidation and find ambiguous predictions on prices and consumer
welfare from larger retailers or retail mergers.
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applying for the same number of licenses would, purely by random draw, end up with different
numbers of stores and thus different post-entry scale. This lottery that allocated licenses to own
and operate retail stores is essentially unprecedented and offers a unique opportunity to study the
role of retail chain scale on outcomes in a transparent way.
Second, because the market is closely monitored by regulators, there exists exceptionally good
data on post-entry outcomes. We observe every transaction conducted in the industry starting with
the first sales, including upstream transactions. This means we directly observe retail prices, store
product assortments, vertical arrangements between retailers and manufacturers, wholesale prices,
and markups, all at the transaction level. These stores do substantial amounts of sales, averaging
$2.2 million per year in revenue. Third, the industry is new and therefore we observe all entry
and the full evolution of firm outcomes over time. This allows us to evaluate whether differences
between firms are short-term effects on new entrants or if they persist. The novelty of the market
as a whole means retailers are especially important. Consumers must discover what products they
value, producers must decide what products to make and how, and retailers act as the intermediaries
between these two groups as the industry evolves, deciding what products to stock, what prices to
charge, what manufacturers to purchase from, and how to compete with rivals.
Using the retail store lottery for identification, we find that stores that are part of multi-store
chains are substantially more profitable than stores operating alone. Their profits are higher by an
average of $380,000 per store per year in the last year of the data, a more than 25% increase. If we
simply compared these retailer profits in cross-sectional data, we would see this positive correlation
between number of outlets and profits, and therefore we might conclude that higher quality firms
earn higher profits and their higher quality also allows them to grow and open more outlets. While
this effect is generally likely to be true, our first contribution is to show that there is a direct causal
effect as well. Firm size matters, and higher scale causes higher profits. Moreover, for the type of
firm operating a mom-and-pop style retail outlet, this difference in profits is enormous.
Our second contribution is to study the mechanism causing larger firms to earn higher profits.
Doing so helps shed light on several ongoing debates. By showing direct causal effects of firm size
and market concentration on prices and markups we contribute to the growing literature study-
ing the long-term growth of markups and its causes. This debate has primarily been informed
by macroeconomic trends, but economy-wide data generally lack the richness to study specific
mechanisms and find robust causal effects. Further, models of imperfect competition used in the
3
macroeconomic markup literature sometimes produce an inherently positive relationship between
firm size and markups as well as a positive relationship between market concentration and markups
(see Kimball (1995) for example or Mrázová and Neary (2017) for an overview). This literature has
also primarily used production function estimates to infer markups, where we can observe them
directly.
A view from IO has noted that concentration and markups can increase at the same time under
richer models of imperfect competition (Syverson (2019)) and argued for a more nuanced view of
the mechanisms generating markups and their implications for welfare (Berry et al. (2019)). At
the same time, the IO literature has produced a rich but somewhat contradictory set of predictions
on how firm size will effect prices and markups. In particular, the theoretical study of consumer
search and retail competition has made great progress in advancing our understanding of the role
of the retail sector in markets with consumer search costs, but fundamental issues still remain
unresolved. One of these is why different retail stores charge different prices for the same product,
and in particular whether larger retailers will ultimately charge higher or lower prices, holding costs
and other factors fixed. The disagreement stems from different ways of modeling the nature of
consumer search and demand and how these effect retailer pricing incentives.
One view, shown in models such as McAfee (1994) and Armstrong and Vickers (2020) is that
larger firms should have more “captive” customers who do not price search and therefore they should
charge higher prices than smaller firms.2 Another view emphasizes that retailers with more outlets
can more easily offer larger assortments, which Anderson and De Palma (2006) demonstrate should
result in higher prices.
On the other hand, if the firm with multiple outlets is more prominent but its customers are
not “captive”, it should have an incentive to charge lower prices to prevent them from searching
at rivals (Armstrong et al. (2009)). Retail stores that offer more products might also attract a
more price-sensitive “mass market” set of consumers while small firms are left to offer a more niche
assortment but sell at higher prices to high value consumers (Rhodes (2015)). This would lead
chain retailers to charge lower prices but earn higher profits. Thus, it is ultimately an empirical
question why different stores can charge different prices for the same good, whether large or small
2Prior work has found that both hotel chains and chain restaurants benefit from reputation effects that allow
them to charge significantly higher overall prices in this way, see Hollenbeck (2017) and Klopack (2018). Hollenbeck
(2017) finds that chain hotels earn roughly 25% higher revenues than otherwise identical independent hotels and
attributes this to greater consumer information on chain hotel quality due to their ability to build reputation over
multiple outlets. Klopack (2018) finds a similar demand side advantage in the restaurant industry.
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firms will charge higher prices, and whether increases in market concentration will cause higher or
lower prices.
We therefore investigate the mechanism causing firms with more retail stores to have higher
profits and emphasize retail pricing decisions. We find that larger firms charge substantially lower
retail prices than smaller firms, including for the same products. Because we observe wholesale
prices, we can rule out that this is merely the result of cost-side economies of scale. While we do
find evidence of traditional cost-side retail economies of scale, in that the larger firms pay lower
wholesale prices for the same products as smaller firms, the difference in retail prices is substantially
larger. Larger retailers charge both lower prices and lower margins, in other words. This is despite
having larger assortments and presumably enjoying higher awareness or reputation, as well as higher
market power.
Among the models predicting lower prices for larger firms, we find that the evidence is more
consistent with the view that larger assortments attract more price-sensitive customers (Rhodes
(2015)) as opposed to them pricing lower due to a prominence effect. The gap in prices between
large and small firms is not initially present but grows substantially over time, as does the difference
in assortment size between stores in multi-store chains and stores operating alone.3 The difference
in profits between large and small firms is similarly growing over time. Next, we estimate a simple
model of consumer demand and find that multi-store firms face significantly more price sensitive
customers than do single-store firms and that this difference is growing over time. The evidence
suggests that consumer demand shifts outwards for larger firms, as evidenced by their higher profits
and sales, but the marginal consumer visiting a multi-store firm is substantially more price sensitive
than the marginal consumer faced by a single-store firm. These results together suggest that cus-
tomer preferences over retailers in this industry are driven more by preference for larger assortments
and that this assortment effect has a downward effect on prices (as in Rhodes (2015)) rather than
upward (as in Anderson and De Palma (2006)).
Additionally, we test the results at the market level, and measure the causal effect of market
concentration on markups and prices. To do so we estimate a simple matching model comparing
markets with multi-store chains to those without. Markets are matched using the number of licenses
allocated and the number of applications filed, both pre-lottery outcomes, and we argue that,
3A similar type of result is seen in Ilanes and Moshary (2019), who study the deregulation of Washington’s retail
liquor industry and find that increases in competition lead firms to offer larger assortments.
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conditional on these two variables assignment of the treatment is effectively random. Our results
show that markets that randomly receive higher levels of concentration have lower average prices
and markups than less concentrated markets.4
These results have significant implications to the study of concentration in retail markets and
about market concentration more broadly. In principle, consumers could either benefit or be harmed
by a more concentrated retail sector with larger chain retailers. We find the evidence is more
consistent with the view that concentration alone or firm size alone are poor measures of market
power. We show that larger firms charge lower prices, lower margins, and offer larger assortments,
each of which clearly benefit consumers, and these benefits do not just result from lowering retailer
costs. This fact is directly relevant to growing debates over horizontal mergers among competing
retailers.5 More broadly, our results show that when many strategic variables are available to firms
and are chosen simultaneously, and when consumers respond endogenously, large firms can increase
their profits substantially in ways other than charging higher markups than small firms. Similarly,
more concentrated markets may have lower average prices and markups than less concentrated
markets depending on the endogenous choices of larger firms.
While we acknowledge the limitation of our study to relatively small firms in a single industry,
industry studies have the potential to inform this debate in ways that aggregate studies cannot. For
the broader debates on trends in firm size and concentration and their effects on prices, markups,
and welfare, the value of industry studies are that they allow the researcher to model and account
for industry idiosyncrasies that aggregate data miss out on. Comparing levels of concentration and
prices across industries might miss out on differences in demand and richer strategic responses by
firms that are endogenous and interact with pricing. In addition, and most importantly, econometric
techniques can be used to help analyze the causal effect between the two variables. And while our
4Prior work has shown that markups can fall at the same time that concentration increases. For instance, Syverson
(2004a), Syverson (2004b) show that increases in the extent to which consumers can substitute between producers
can shift market share to larger but lower cost producers. More closely related is Goldmanis et al. (2010) who show
that reductions in search costs brought about by e-commerce can increase concentration and decrease margins in
retail settings. Our results and our emphasis on consumer search as a mechanism are consistent with these prior
studies, although our empirical design is not to study the effects of changes in search costs but to study changes in
size and concentration directly.
5A key issue in the analysis of downstream or retail mergers is the concept of countervailing buyer power, that is
the idea that an increase in market power downstream might benefit consumers by increasing retailer buyer power
relative to suppliers, decreasing input prices, and passing a portion of the savings along to consumers. While we do
not literally study a merger, the random variation in number of stores in a chain allows us to analyze the effects
of concentration on input and final prices. It is a theoretical debate in what conditions a downstream merger can
improve social surplus (Inderst and Shaffer (2007) , Symeonidis (2010), Loertscher and Marx (2019)) and this has
limited empirical evidence (Barrette et al. (2020)). We find that greater downstream market power does reduce
wholesale costs and by lowering prices and increasing quantity sold also benefits consumers.
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study focuses on relatively small retailers, outcomes for small firms and entrepreneurs are often
seen as especially important. Our results show that scale has a substantial effect on the success of
entrepreneurs. This suggests that barriers to scale, such as capital constraints and legal red-tape
have potentially very large costs on entrepreneurs and consumers alike.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the data and setting with an
emphasis on the transaction-level retail data and the retail license lottery, Section 2 provides results
on the differences in variable profits and price and assortment decisions between multi-store chains
and single-store firms, Section 3 studies consumer demand differences between these types of stores,
Section 4 shows results at the market level, and Section 5 discusses and concludes.
1 Data and Setting
This section describes the institutional setting and key features of the data. The regulatory setting
dates back to a November 2012 popular referendum passed by voters in Washington state. The
new law made marijuana products legal for licensed firms to produce and sell and legal to purchase
by any person over 21 years of age. The state legislature subsequently created a tax and regulatory
regime for the new legal market by passing I-502 which set up the rules for the legal market to begin
sales in July 2014. The state created 3 new types of firm licenses, differentiated by their position
in the vertical structure of the industry, similar to the three tier system for alcohol regulation.
Firms can be licensed as retailers, processors, or producers. Processors and producers are allowed
to hold both licenses and vertically integrate, but retailers are not allowed to vertically integrate. In
addition, the total number of retail licenses was strictly capped. This license cap and how licenses
were allocated forms the basis of our empirical strategy and we therefore discuss it at length.
License Lottery:
During the creation of the legal marijuana industry, Washington decided to strictly limit the total
amount of entry by retailers. This was motivated by concerns about widespread use of marijuana,
which is thought to have negative health effects and social externalities.6 In addition, there was a
concern about the impact of over-entry by retailers on neighborhood character and property values.7
Finally, one of the goals of legalization is to remove marijuana sales from the black market so that
6For a review of these issues, see Hall et al. (2019).
7See Tyndall (2019) for a study of the effect of dispensaries on nearby home prices, which finds close to zero but
potentially small negative effects in Vancouver, BC.
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they can be regulated and monitored, and this goal is more easily achieved with fewer retail shops
for regulators to monitor.
The result was the choice to limit entry to an initial total of 334 retailers for the state of
Washington.8 These licenses were allocated at the city level, with the allocation determined by
population, population density, and an estimate of past-month marijuana users taken from historical
survey data. Expectations by market participants were that this industry would be highly lucrative
and demand to enter the industry by entrepreneurs significantly exceeded the number of entrants
preferred by the state government, leading to the unusual choice to allocate licenses via a lottery.
Lotteries were held separately at the city level, and 75 cities experienced excess demand for the
available retail licenses, resulting in 75 different lotteries being held. In addition, in 48 cities there
was not excess demand for licenses. We observe the full list of applicants as well as the ordering
determined by the random draw that constituted each lottery.9 In order to potentially win a retail
license in the lottery, firms needed to file a valid application, which included securing a location
for the retail store within the regulatory guidelines and paying a $250 non-refundable application
fee.10 Among the regulatory guidelines the proposed location of each store had to be at least one
thousand feet from elementary or secondary schools, public parks, libraries, among other locations.
These regulations along with reluctance by landlords to permit cannabis shops made securing the
store location a major barrier to entry for filing an application for the lottery.
Table 1 shows summary statistics on license applications in lottery markets. On average, there
were 4.1 applicants per license in these markets with a wide degree of variation. In the largest
market, Seattle, there were 191 applications for 21 licenses. In order to prevent large firms from
dominating the retail sector, firms were not allowed to own more than 3 retail licenses.11
In July 2015, the state updated its licensing regime. In the first year of the market, Washington
had failed to close down formerly unregulated medical marijuana retailers and they were operating
in a grey market. In July 2015, Washington increased the total number of retail licenses available
from 334 to 556 in order for some of these medical marijuana retailers to enter the market. At the
8This number was chosen somewhat arbitrarily to match the number of state-owned liquor stores under Wash-
ington’s state monopoly on retail alcohol sales that lasted until 2012.
9The lottery results for the market of Longview, WA were not available.
10If issued, the store was responsible for paying a $1000 annual fee for issuance and renewal.
11According to the regulation, "Any entity and/or principals within any entity are limited to no more than three
retail marijuana licenses with no multiple location licensee allowed more than thirty-three percent of the allowed
licenses in any county or city." Other regulations included: the prohibition of internet sales and delivery of product,
the prohibition of sales across state lines and the sale of marijuana products below their acquisition cost.
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same time, any medical marijuana retailer that did not receive a license was forced to close. The
newly available licenses were awarded according to the initial lottery draws and thus these draws
were still overwhelmingly the mechanism by which the new licenses were allocated in the second
wave.
Table 1 also shows the resulting distribution of stores across markets. The number of stores
per thousand people in 2017 was 1.38 but with substantial variation. Table 2 shows the joint
distribution of applications filed in the lottery and store licenses won. Conditional on the number
of applications filed, the number of licenses won is the result of a random draw. This represents
the basis of our identification strategy.
There are two complicating factors. First, licenses can be acquired in both non-lottery markets
or through the secondary market where firms that own licenses can be purchased by other firms.
The second of these is rare and we observe it when it occurs.12 Second, we observe loose partnerships
between stores that are owned by different firms. This typically takes the form of stores operating
under similar names or sharing the same website. We carefully document these practices in our
data.
Ultimately our goal is to compare the outcomes of stores in multi-store chains to those operating
in single-store firms using the lottery to provide cleanly exogenous variation, so multi-store chains
that acquire their licenses in these ways or form partnerships would not make for valid comparisons.
Therefore we take a conservative approach and exclude any firm who acquired its stores outside
the lottery or other multi-store partnerships from our definition of “multi-store”. The result is that
some of the firms we designate as “single-store” may actually benefit from the same economies of
scale as the multi-store firms, either on the cost side or on the demand side. Therefore all our
results should be taken as lower bounds for the true size of these effects. Finally, we note that other
than their chain size, the two types of stores are broadly similar on observable characteristics, with
no significant differences in their entry timing or location, and single-store and multi-store firms
have 13% and 15% of their locations in Seattle, respectively.
We also collect data from Kantar Analytics on advertising spending for firms in this industry.
Summary statistics for this data are shown in the Appendix, as well as robustness tests for our main
results when advertising spending is included as a covariate. We find little difference in advertising
spending between single-store and multi-store firms and little change in our results when advertising
12Only 32 licenses are bought or sold during the sample period.
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is included.
Transactions Data:
In addition to the awarding of entry rights via lottery, there is a second unique feature of this setting.
In order to tightly monitor the marijuana industry, Washington requires all industry participants
to enter all transactions into an administrative database. Thus we are able to observe all sales that
have ever taken place in the industry, including both retail sales to consumers and sales between
retailers and wholesalers, both at the transaction level. These data include both retail price and
wholesale price for each transaction. Observing wholesale costs is particularly unusual as this is
typically carefully guarded information.
Most notably, we are able to construct profit margins at the transaction level by measuring the
wholesale price each retailer paid for each product and link those prices to the final retail sale. In
addition, the sum of these margins over all transactions gives a direct measure of variable profits.
In total, we observe roughly 80 million transactions worth $2.5 billion between July 2014 and
September 2017. Table 3 presents summary information on the distribution of monthly revenues
and variable profits across firms and time.
Retailers in this industry earn large revenues, with a mean of $180,000 per month or $2.2 million
per year in 2017. This is somewhat right-skewed, as the largest retailers average $6-10 million per
year. To provide a comparison, the average store-level revenue is approximately 3-4 times larger
than the average revenue of Washington’s liquor stores from 2012-2015, according to Ilanes and
Moshary (2019).
Table 3 also shows the distribution of average prices and total monthly sales across firms and
time. Figure 1 shows visually how average wholesale and retail prices started out much higher in the
first year of the industry, were highly volatile for the first 12 months, and eventually settled down
to a stable lower price. In 2017, retailers charged an average price of $15.2 per unit for marijuana
products and paid an average price of $7.5 per unit to their upstream supplier. This leaves an
average profit margin of .54, or a markup of roughly 140%. Because prices are volatile and falling
in the first two years of the data as most firms (manufacturers and retailers) are still entering the
market, we focus most of our analysis on the last year of the data when the market is relatively
stable and mature.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for 74 markets
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Initial Cap 3.43 3.72 1 21
Revised Cap 5.82 6.92 1 42
Applicants per Market 15.07 25.62 2 191
Distinct companies per Market 12.52 18.69 2 135
Applicants per License 4.07 2.78 1.25 16
Prob. Win 0.34 0.17 0.06 0.8
Stores per 1k People[1] 0.35 1.65 0.01 29.41
Note: [1] Population count is taken from the 2010 Census. Number of
stores from Jan/2017.
Table 2: Joint Distribution of Applications and Licenses
Approved
A
p
p
li
ed
1 2 3
1 117 0 0
2 60 10 0
3 76 18 3
4 26 8 0
5+ 22 10 3
Note: This table shows the joint distribution of
applications filed and stores ultimately won in
the 2014 retail lottery.
2 Effects of Scale on Profits and Prices
The first question we study is whether there exists a direct causal effect of firm scale on profits in
the retail sector and how large is it. In general, scale is a strategic choice. We therefore expect
11
Table 3: Monthly Variable Profits, Revenue, and Total Sales
Mean Std. Dev. 5th %ile 95th %ile Mean Mean Mean
Subsample: Seattle Lottery Non-Lottery
Variable profit:
2014 45,508 66,328.6 555.7 179,369.4 112251.7 49,870.6 29,966.2
2015 81,505.8 88,407.5 3,734.2 239,839.5 128,837.8 91,067.3 52,886.7
2016 96,069.7 95,846.3 5,670.3 274,647 109,313.7 116,866 66,536
2017 83,793.1 82,037.6 6,184.9 240,325.5 97,674.2 104,280.7 63,831.4
Revenue:
2014 81,441 106,468.4 3,274.8 312,072.5 210,699 89,991.1 50,981.5
2015 146,057.4 152,181.1 10,131.5 428,832 233,379.1 162,932.6 95,547.5
2016 184,124.4 180,933.7 13,512.1 540,096.4 204,465.8 222,994.6 128,923.6
2017 170,765 162,839.2 14,538.1 487,896.3 193,003.8 211,094.9 131,470.3
Retail Price:
2014 17.9 6.4 8.1 29.6 18.9 18.4 16
2015 10.9 2.7 7.3 15.2 11.7 11.1 10.4
2016 8.8 1.7 6.6 11 9.5 8.9 8.8
2017 8.3 1.3 5.8 10.3 8.8 8.3 8.3
Total Units Sold:
2014 4,541 5,468.9 232 15,213.8 12,529.6 5,106.5 2,526.7
2015 13,801.1 14,590.9 893.4 40,924 20,973.8 15,325.5 9,238.6
2016 21,214.5 21,443 1,564.4 59,753 21,875.8 25,547.5 15,060.9
2017 21,029.9 20,838.4 1,618.7 59,033.6 21,969 26,012.5 16,175.3
Note: This table shows summary data on store-level variable profits, revenues, retail prices, and units sold. Data shown are monthly
and do not include the first partial month in which each store opened. Retail price data and total sales are calculated within store each
month. Lottery markets refer to markets where excess demand for retail licenses resulted in entry lotteries.
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Figure 1: Average Retail and Wholesale Price By Category Over Time ($/gram)
Note: These figures show category level average retail prices and wholesale prices over time.
Retail prices are shown on the left and are tax-inclusive. Wholesale prices are shown on the right.
a positive association between firm size and profits, but this is due in part because more efficient
firms are able to grow larger by expanding and adding more outlets. In this case, it is a challenge
to separately identify the effect of scale from firm quality in profitability. Our setting removes this
aspect of reverse causation and allows us to directly measure the effect of randomly generated size
differences on profitability.
An important component of the empirical strategy is that we observe the applications filed that
did not win licenses via the lottery. Firms who apply for more entry licenses may have higher quality
management, greater commitment to the industry, or be better capitalized than firms applying for
fewer licenses. This generates potential concerns that scale itself is not random, but a direct result of
the number of applications submitted by the firm. We are able to control for number of applications
filed and rely on the retail license lottery to generate random variation in firm size.
2.1 Variable Profits
Our primary dependent variable is the variable profits constructed from the transaction-level sales
data. These are defined as total monthly revenues minus total monthly wholesale costs incurred.
This differs from profits after other costs such as rents, wages, marketing and other costs. We
discuss below how these costs may effect the interpretation of our results but take observed variable
profits as the initial benchmark outcome of interest.
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Table 4: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Store Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Multi-store (lottery) 29029.4*** 24833.5*** 24456.7*** 32031.1*** 31799.4***
(6350.790) (6446.837) (6436.918) (6025.207) (5512.789)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3262 3262
R2 0.006 0.022 0.029 0.483 0.579
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of being in a multi-store firm on store-level variable profits. Only multi-store
firms who acquired each of their licenses via the retail lottery are included. Data sample period is April 2016 to
April 2017. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the store level.
We ultimately want to identify the causal effect of firm size as measured by whether or not a
store is part of a multi-store chain on store-level profits. To measure this effect we regress store
profits on an indicator for whether or not the firm won multiple stores in the lottery. Table 4 shows
the results of this regression with different fixed effects included. In each case we focus on the last
year of the data in recognition of the fact that this is an evolving market with entry of new firms
(both at the retail level and upstream) taking place throughout 2014-2016 and prices falling rapidly
in 2014-2015. By the last year of the data the industry is more mature and the number of firms
and their prices and sales levels are relative stable.
First, in column 1 we show the baseline result with no control variables. It shows that stores
in multi-store chains earn roughly $29,000 more in variable profits than single-store firms. Col-
umn 2 includes fixed effects for number of applications filed in order to account for differences in
management quality or capitalization that may lead to more applications and thus more stores.
The coefficient on the multi-store firm dummy therefore isolates the effect of larger firm size on
profits which, conditional on the number of applications filed, is generated by random chance via
the lottery. This reduces the profit difference to just under $25,000 per month. Columns 3 and
4 show the effects of date and market fixed effects, respectively. These fixed effects control for
differences across markets in profitability and time trends. Finally, column 5 shows the results with
each of these as well as age fixed effects to account for differences in entry timing and the natural
increase in profits during a firm’s first year. Accounting for each of these results in shows that
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Table 5: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Store Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2016-17 2014-2017 2016-17 2016-17 2016-17
Stores ≤ 1 year old Stores > 1 year old ln(profits)
Multi-store (lottery) 31799.4*** 23706.6*** 24710.7*** 66977.3*** 0.55***
(5512.789) (4761.062) (5991.844) (8972.588) (0.064)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3262 5523 1530 1817 3262
R2 0.579 0.513 0.596 0.633 0.540
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of being in a multi-store firm on store-level variable profits. The dependent variable is variable
profits in columns 1-4 and log of variable profits in column 5. Data sample period is April 2016 to April 2017 in columns 2-5 and
2014-2017 in column 1. Columns 3 and 4 show results only for stores less than one year old greater than 1 year old, respectively.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the store level.
after conditioning on number of applications as well as market, time, and age, stores in multi-store
chains earn roughly $32,000 higher monthly profits than single-store firms. The effect is highly
significant and its size amounts to roughly $380, 000 in higher annual profits. This difference is
quite substantial, as median store profits during this period are $820,000 per year and mean store
profits are just under $1.2 million.
Next, we take our preferred specification with all fixed effects included and show how the effect
varies over different subsamples of the data. Column 1 repeats the main result from Table 4 that
used only the last year of the data. Columns 2 repeats this result using the full sample from 2014 to
2017. We find a smaller overall effect when the initial years of data are included. This is supported
by Figure 2, which illustrates the result visually, showing the average monthly variable profits of
multi-store and single-store firms throughout the sample period. They begin the sample roughly
equal and multi-store firms slowly gain a profit advantage which becomes significant in 2016 and
continues to grow through the end of the sample period. This shows that the profit advantage is not
simply a feature of an initial period when the industry was just ramping up. Instead, the advantage
associated with being a member of a chain is growing with time. This figure also illustrates the
magnitude of the effect of firm size on store profits.
Columns 3 and 4 compare the effect size for firms in their first year of operation relative to the
period after the first year. The profit advantage associated with being part of a multi-store firm is
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substantially larger later on in a store’s life compared with a smaller advantage in the first year.
Again this suggests the advantage is not temporary but is something that grows over time. Finally,
column 5 shows the result when the dependent variable is log of profits, to account for potentially
large variance and skewness in this variable.
Appendix 8 shows this causal effect of scale on profits is robust to a series of potentially confound-
ing factors. These include robustness tests for strategic entry into markets with less competition for
lottery slots, replication of the results with product fixed effects included, and tests for the impact
of store advertising.
Figure 2: Variable Profits Over Time
2.1.1 Entry Timing Tests:
Next we explore the profit advantage enjoyed by multi-store firms by studying how the timing of
entry by the stores in a multi-store chain effect their partner firms’ profits. One possible explanation
for the profit advantage caused by being in a multi-store firm is that firms can use the profits
generated by their first store to open a larger or higher quality second or third store, thus generating
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Table 6: Timing of Main Effects
(1) (2)
All Multi-Store Firms First Entrants Only
Entry order=2 or 3 -58124.2
(54960.972)
# Stores open>1 19495.6
(16068.771)
# Applications FE Yes Yes
Store Age in Months FE Yes Yes
Firm Age in Months FE Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes
Observations 324 207
R2 0.806 0.808
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows results for two subsamples of multi-store firms. The dependent variable
in both columns is variable profits. Column 1 shows results for all stores in multi-store firms
and shows the effects of being the 2nd or 3rd entrant on variable profits. Column 2 shows
results only for stores who were the first entrant in a multi-store firm and shows the effects of
the 2nd firm’s entry on the focal stores variable profits.
higher average variable profits. Table 6 shows the result investigating this mechanism. Column 1
of Table 6 shows that, among multi-store firms only, stores that enter second or third are not
more profitable compared to the first store opened by that firm. In fact, after conditioning on firm
age and time fixed effects, later entrants are less profitable than first entrants but not statistically
significantly so. The lower profits experience by these stores may be due to a strategic decision to
open in more desirable locations first and less desirable locations later. This rules out a story where
the multi-stores are more profitable per store through a larger investment in fixed costs in second
or third stores after successfully operating one store for some period of time.
Similarly, we compare the effect of being in a multi-store firm on the first entrants in each firm
by using the timing of future store entries. Column 2 of Table 6 uses only first entrant members of
multi-store firms and shows that when the number of stores in the firm goes from 1 to 2, the profits
of the first entrant increase conditional on age, time and market fixed effects. Again, the result is
not statistically significant due to the small sample size. This is suggestive that the profits of the
first entrant increase after the second entrant opens, though.
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2.2 Prices, Wholesale Costs, Sales, and Margins
Next we explore the mechanism by which larger scale causes higher profits. The theoretical literature
on retail competition makes ambiguous predictions on whether larger or more prominent retailers
will charge higher or lower prices than smaller retailers, all else equal. This makes this setting
especially interesting to investigate the effect of scale on pricing decisions as a primary mechanism.
This also serves as a test of to what extent greater market power leads retailers to increase prices.
Two stores owned by the same firm should internalize the pricing externality and raise prices as a
result.
We begin by using transaction level data on sales and prices to construct average retail prices,
average wholesale prices, variable profits per unit sold, and total units sold. We use data at the
product level to allow for product fixed effects, whereas variables were calculated at the store
level in the previous subsection. We define product at the manufacturer-category level, thus if a
manufacturer makes multiple products in the same category we aggregate these together.
Table 7 shows the effect of being in a multi-store firm on each of these variables. The effect
on variable profits is smaller because the unit of observation is now product as opposed to store.
We observe that, as expected, multi-store firms have lower average wholesale prices than single-
store firms. This is the traditional notion of economies of scale in retail, and results from volume
discounts and greater bargaining power with suppliers.
We also observe that multi-store firms set significantly lower retail prices than single-store firms
for the same products. This difference does not merely result from the multi-store firms passing
along the lower wholesale costs to final retail prices. Wholesale prices are lower by $.21 on average,
compared to a $.36 difference in retail prices. Consequently, multi-store firms have significantly
lower variable profits per unit sold than single-store firms. They are able to have significantly
higher overall variable profits despite this because they sell substantially more total units. Multi-
store firms sell 54 more units of each product per month than single-store firms, a roughly 14%
higher sales volume.
It is notable that the profit advantage enjoyed by stores that are members of multi-store firms
comes through lower prices and lower margins and not the opposite. Several plausible advantages
of chain membership would be expected to result in higher and not lower prices. These include
including greater reputation or consumer awareness, lower competition since chain stores do not
compete with one another, and higher quality stores with larger assortments. The effect of a
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Table 7: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Primary Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5)
Variable Profit Retail Price Wholesale Price Profit/Unit Units sold
Multi-Store 154.1*** -0.36*** -0.21*** -0.15** 54.1***
(36.183) (0.082) (0.039) (0.054) (11.654)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173618 173618 173618 173618 173618
R2 0.231 0.726 0.751 0.608 0.201
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 5 outcome variables. In each column the
dependent variable is described in the column header. Data sample period is April 2016 to April 2017. The observation
level is product-store-week.
reduction on competition by removing a competitor should be even more valuable in this setting
due to the lack of potential entry. We observe that the median number of stores in a market is
4 and stores that are part of multi-store firms tend to be located near each other, with a median
distance of 16 miles and 90% of stores are within 20 miles of their chain partners. Therefore these
multi-store chains have potentially substantial pricing power in their local areas and yet still charge
lower prices than stores operating alone.
We note that removing the product fixed effects from these specifications yields nearly identical
results for retail and wholesale prices, and slightly larger effects on units sold and thus variable
profit. This suggests that the results are not driven by differences in composition of products
offered, where multi-store chains offer more low quality products.
While the previous result focused on the last year of the data when store entry and pricing had
stabilized, in Table 8 we show how the results for each of these dependent variables changes over
the full 2014 to 2017 sample period. Notably, we see a clear time trend in that the difference in
average prices charged by multi-store firms is growing over time. The price difference is negligible
in 2015 but grows to $.69 by 2017. This represents a substantial gap in average prices as the median
price of 1 unit is $6.65 in 2017. We see no clear trend over time in wholesale prices, where there is
a clear advantage to multi-store firms in 2015 but no change over time. This suggests the growth
in the pricing gap is not caused by simply passing along to customers the wholesale costs savings
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Table 8: Change Over Time in Effects of Multi-Store Firm Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5)
Variable Profit Retail Price Wholesale Price Profit/Unit Units sold
Multi-Store=1 × year=2015 -427.1*** 0.071 -0.28*** 0.35** -89.4***
(79.616) (0.168) (0.080) (0.111) (22.172)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2016 122.5** -0.20* -0.22*** 0.013 33.4**
(41.471) (0.087) (0.042) (0.058) (11.549)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2017 202.4** -0.69*** -0.25*** -0.44*** 68.7***
(61.627) (0.130) (0.062) (0.086) (17.162)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 251867 251867 251867 251867 251867
R2 0.219 0.718 0.732 0.604 0.204
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 5 outcome variables. In each column the dependent variable
is described in the column header. The observation level is product-store-week.
associated with chain membership.
Price margins, as measured by variable profit per unit sold, also fall substantially over time,
from a positive $.35 gap in 2015 to negative $.44 in 2017. At the same time, there is a large relative
increase in the number of units sold per product, from 90 fewer units per month in 2015 to 69 more
units in 2017.
This growth in the price and profit advantage associated with multi-store chain membership
over time are consistent with the overall pattern shown in Figure 2. We visualize the difference in
retail prices over time in a similar way in Figure 3, and for wholesale prices in Figure 4.
2.3 Assortment
This section investigates results for assortment decisions. Choosing how many and which products
to stock are key decisions of a retailer. The theoretical literature on retail strategy and customer
preferences has grown to emphasize that the number of products sold and consumer search over
multiple products have significant interactions.
Retailers in this industry carry products from a set of five main categories, but carry potentially
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Figure 3: Retail Price Gap Grows Over Time
Note: This figure shows average retail prices over time for multi-store firms and single-store firms.
The grey area represents 95% confidence intervals.
very large numbers of varieties within those categories.13 Carrying products from a manufacturer
incurs a fixed cost, and multi-store chains may be able to split that fixed cost over multiple stores
such that the benefit of carrying one more product outweighs the cost for a larger number of
products. We investigate whether this is true following the same empirical strategy as in the
previous section.
Using transaction level data we construct the number of unique products sold in each store
in each month as well as the number of brands or manufacturers purchased from in each month.
Results are shown in Table 9, which shows the effect of being a member of a multi-store chain on
assortment size defined these ways. Multi-store firms offer larger assortments defined in both ways
compared to single-store firms, on a per-store basis. Figure 5 also demonstrates this visually. At
the beginning of the sample single-store and multi-store firms offer similar assortment sizes but
13The categories are: usable marijuana (leaf) products, solid edible products, liquid products, extract products for
vaporizers, and “other” miscellaneous products. Together these account for over 95% of product sales and products
are defined by these categories in the regulatory transactions data.
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Figure 4: Wholesale Price Over Time
Note: This figure shows average wholesale prices over time for multi-store firms and single-store
firms. The grey area represents 95% confidence intervals.
over time the multi-store firms increase their per-store assortments. The disparity in number of
products and number of brands offered increases consistently over the course of the sample.
These combined results showing multi-store firms offer larger assortments and charge lower prices
are consistent with the model of Rhodes (2015), which shows that when consumers desire multiple
products and have search costs, firms that offer more products will attract a larger but more price-
sensitive set of consumers. This model makes specific predictions about consumer demand which
we explore in the next section. An alternative explanation is that larger firms such as multi-store
chains have greater name recognition or awareness in a market and thus may be the first choice for
consumers searching for a specific product or low price. In this case, Armstrong et al. (2009) predicts
that this prominence gives these stores an incentive to charge lower prices to deter customers from
searching elsewhere. We test the prediction of this model in Appendix 7 and do not find support
for prominence effects causing lower prices.
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Figure 5: Number of Unique Products and Brands Over Time
3 Consumer Demand
In this section we estimate store-level consumer demand elasticities for each firm type over time.
The previous section has showed that multi-store firms eventually charge significantly lower prices
and margins than single-store firms, offer larger product varieties, and earn significantly higher
profits. This leaves open the question of whether this strategy is replicable by single-store firms.
That is, does each firm type face the same consumer demand and or do multi-store firms face a
different marginal customer in terms of price sensitivity? Answering this will also further shed light
on what mechanism results in the substantially higher profits earned by multi-store chains.
We proceed to separately estimate the store-level elasticity of demand faced by each firm type
over time. We follow Hoch et al. (1995) and Hitsch et al. (2019) in estimating and aggregating
demand elasticities using category-level prices and sales volumes. Let Jst consist of the categories
sold at store s at week t. We construct these at the weekly level and estimate the following log-log
demand equation:
log(qjst) = αs +
∑
k∈Jst
βjklog(pjst) + τt + ǫjst (1)
We construct sales-weighted average prices pjst at the category level. αs are store fixed effects and
τt are county-week fixed effects. These account for local time-varying demand shocks and store-level
time-invariant factors such as location or market-level demographics. We estimate this equation
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Table 9: Multi-Store Firms Offer Larger Assortments
(1) (2)
Number Unique Products Number Brands
Multi-Store 6.82** 5.15***
(2.451) (0.932)
# Applications Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes
Obs 4637 4650
R2 0.126 0.465
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 2
measures of assortment size. In each column the dependent variable is described
in the column header. Number of products is the monthly number of unique
inventory IDs at the store level. Number of brands is the monthly number of
processors purchased from at the store level.
separately for each category. The result are estimates of average own-price elasticities βjj and
cross-price elasticities βjk for every category and category-pair.
After including category, county-week, and store fixed effects there remains the possibility that
there are unobserved demand shocks at the store-week level that are correlated with prices and
cause price to be endogenous. This would bias price elasticity estimates towards zero. We use the
availability of product-level wholesale prices to construct cost-shifting instruments. In particular,
we construct the average category-level wholesale prices of all stores in a market and use these as
instruments for retail prices. This assumes that wholesale prices have a direct effect on retail prices
but not on final demand. The reason we use market-level averages is that if wholesalers observe the
same store-week demand shocks and have sufficient market power to adjust store-specific wholesale
prices, those prices would also respond to the same demand shocks. Using market-level wholesale
prices avoids this potential issue.
3.1 Results of Demand Estimation
The estimated own-price elasticities are negative and lower than 1 for all categories. We thus focus
on the usable (leaf) marijuana product category which accounts for over 84% of sales. We estimate
demand separately for different firm type and time periods. Of particular interest is whether
multi-store firms face different marginal demand than single-store firms. Because we observe that
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multi-store firms charge lower prices and earn higher sales, if they face the same demand curve as
single-store firms our estimated price coefficients might be closer to 0 as they are simply pricing in
a more inelastic region of the same demand curve. In other words, we cannot conclude the two firm
types face different demand if the multi-store firms have price elasticities closer to 0 in absolute
value since this might just indicate movement along the demand curve rather than different demand
curves.
Table 10 shows the estimated store-level elasticities by store type. Elasticities are estimated
with the prices of the other categories included in the regression but their coefficients are excluded
for space. We see that the OLS results are close to 1 for both firm types. When instruments are
included elasticities are substantially more negative, indicating the OLS results are biased towards
zero. The multi-store price coefficient is significantly more negative than the single-store coefficient.
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Table 10: Estimated Price Elasticities
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Single-Store × ln(Price) -1.01*** -1.75***
(0.032) (0.157)
Multi-Store × ln(Price) -1.08*** -3.79***
(0.110) (0.284)
Single-Store × Year=2015 ×ln(Price) -0.64***
(0.041)
Single-Store × Year=2016 × ln(Price) -1.22***
(0.041)
Single-Store × Year=2017 × ln(Price) -1.67***
(0.059)
Multi-Store × Year=2015 × ln(Price) 0.0041
(0.129)
Multi-Store × Year=2016 × ln(Price) -1.24***
(0.145)
Multi-Store × Year=2017 × ln(Price) -2.92***
(0.361)
Store FE Yes Yes Yes
Market*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23068 23068 23068
R2 0.882 0.866 0.891
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows estimated price elasticities for each store type in different
subsamples based on year. In each column the dependent variable is ln(Units
sold). Both units sold and price are for the usable marijuana product category.
Elasticities are estimated with the prices of the other categories included in the
regression but their coefficients are excluded for space.
Next, we test how these elasticities vary over time. Given that the stores and products are new
and there is rapid entry in 2014 and 2015, we expect consumer demand responses may shift over
time. We modify the demand model in equation 1 to allow for separate βjk coefficients for each
store type each year in the data.
We find very inelastic demand in the beginning of the data, perhaps as few stores have entered
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and firms are still learning the about demand. Elasticities are below 1 in absolute value indicating
firms may charge higher than the profit-maximizing price. In 2016 the coefficients for both types
are more elastic, and multi-store firms’ demand is similar to single-store firms’. By 2017 demand is
more elastic for both store types, presumably due to greater competition stores who were awarded
licenses in the lottery continue to enter the industry during the full sample. By 2017, multi-store
firms face substantially more elastic demand than single-store firms. The pairwise comparison of
2017 coefficients is highly significant.
This difference in elasticities is true despite the fact that multi-store firms are also charging
significantly lower retail prices than single-store firms. These results suggest that over time con-
sumer demand shifts outwards for multi-store firms, as evidenced by their higher profits and sales,
but also that the marginal consumer visiting a multi-store firm is substantially more price sensitive
than the marginal consumer faced by a single-store firm.
4 Market Concentration and Markups
In this section we investigate the relationship between market concentration and markups. There
is a growing interest in whether or not there is a long-term trend towards firms charging higher
markups as shown by (De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) and De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger
(2018)). Some speculate that this increase in markups is caused by greater industry concentration
as a result of lax antitrust policy or the growth of superstar firms. We explore this mechanism
in our setting, which has exogenous variation in firm size and market concentration and where we
can observe markups directly. Previously, we have shown that larger firms charge lower prices and
lower markups. The analysis so far has been conducted at the store level. We now turn to the
market as the unit of analysis and measure the effects of greater market concentration on average
market-level prices and markups.
Conditional on the number of licenses allocated to a market and the number of applications
filed in the lottery, whether or not a market contains stores that are part of a multi-store chain is
effectively the result of random chance. Here, concentration should be measured at the firm level
not the store level. This is because stores that are owned by the same firm will internalize the
effects of price competition among themselves, and the presence of multi-store chains in a market
correspond directly to higher market concentration.
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We first show the negative relationship between concentration and markups holds in the cross
section of markets in our data. To do so we calculate the level of concentration in a market as the
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a measure of concentration that adjusts for the number
of firms in a market. It is calculated as:
H∗ =
H − 1
N
1− 1
N
(2)
where H =
∑N
i s
2
i , si is the market share of firm i, and N is the number of stores in a market. In
Figure 6 we show the significant and positive relationship between this measure of concentration
and the proportion of stores in a market that are members of a multi-store chain, excluding markets
with none.
Figure 6: Market Concentration and Lottery Outcomes
Note: This figure shows the relationship between the share of stores in market that are part of
multi-store chains and the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index index. Only markets with at
least one chain store are shown.
Then, we measure the causal effect of this increase in concentration on markups and prices. To
do so we estimate a simple matching model comparing markets with multi-store chains to those
without. Our approach consists of matching markets using the number of licenses allocated and the
number of applications filed, both of which are pre-lottery outcomes. We argue that conditional on
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these two variables, assignment of the treatment is effectively random. We perform the match using
nearest neighbor matching, calculated using the Mahalanobis distance. This algorithm is convenient
for this case because we match on two integer-valued variables and less transparent procedures like
propensity-score matching are not needed.
As in the previous section, we use data from 2016-2017 to calculate average prices and markups
weighted by sales at the market-month level. Table 11 shows results for the matching estimation as
well as an OLS specification. The OLS specification includes fixed effects for the number of licenses,
the number of applications filed, and month.
Table 11: Effects of Concentration on Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Matching Matching
Avg. Price Avg. Markups Avg. Price Avg. Markups
Presence of Multi-Store Firm(s) -0.59*** -0.058*** -0.69*** -0.041***
(0.035) (0.008) (0.028) (0.006)
Number of Licenses FE Yes Yes
Number of Applications FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Observations 3367 3367 3367 3367
R2 0.728 0.638
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the results from OLS and matching regression of the effect of greater concentration on average
market level prices and markups. Concentration is measured using a dummy for the presence of multi-store firms and
the unit of observation is a city-month. In Columns 3-4 matching is done using a nearest neighbor algorithm using
number of licenses and number of applications to match, with exact matching on month.
Our results show that both prices and markups are significantly lower in markets with multi-
store chains, despite the fact that these markets have higher concentration. These effects are large
in magnitude and robust to specification.
Combined with the previous results showing that larger firms charge lower prices, these results
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provide evidence against some stylized models of firm concentration and markups. Under these
models, firms compete in Cournot outcomes and greater concentration mechanically translates to
higher markups. Our results show that when many strategic variables are available to firms and
are chosen simultaneously, and when consumers respond endogenously, large firms can increase
their profits substantially in ways other than charging higher markups than small firms. Similarly,
more concentrated markets may have lower average prices and markups than less concentrated
markets depending on the endogenous choices of larger firms. Together, these results highlight the
importance of using industry specific data with careful examination of the mechanisms involved to
advance the debate on concentration and markups.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We study the nature of economies of scale in the retail sector using a natural experiment that
randomly allocated different numbers of retail outlets to different firms. We find that scale, in the
form of number of outlets, has a significant impact on retailer strategy and firm outcomes. Larger
retailers charge substantially lower margins, face lower wholesale costs, and earn higher total sales.
The result is a profit advantage worth more than $380,000 per store per year.
A simple comparison of retailer profits and chains size in this data would observe a strong positive
correlation between number of outlets and profits, and therefore might conclude that better firms
have higher profits and also grow and open more outlets. While this simultaneity effect is likely a
true feature of retail chain growth, our data show there is also a direct effect of greater scale on
profits. We can also conclude that the source of these economies of scale is not just the traditional
cost advantage associated with large retailers. While this advantage is present, retailers do not
simply pass their lower costs along to consumers but also charge significantly lower margins as well.
The result is substantially lower prices at multi-store firms compared to stores operating alone.
It is not obvious ex ante whether larger firms should charge higher or lower prices, or whether
they would face more or less price-sensitive consumers. Larger firms face less competition and more
concentrated markets, which in isolation should allow them to charge higher prices. In addition, by
having multiple outlets they may have greater consumer reputation or by offering larger assortments
they offer a higher quality shopping experience. This might attract the less price-sensitive higher
valuation consumers, leaving smaller single-store firms to compete for low valuation consumers by
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offering lower prices.
Another view is that stores with greater awareness and larger varieties will attract a more
mainstream consumer base, who will have lower average willingness-to-pay than stores that sell
fewer products. This mechanism is demonstrated in Rhodes (2015), who shows how in the presence
of search costs and consumers who value multiple products, large firms will carry a larger assortment
and attract a more price-sensitive “mass market” set of consumers while small firms offer a more
niche assortment and sell to high value consumers. Our evidence is consistent with this model. We
find a large outward shift in demand associated with stores being members of a multi-store chain,
but also a shift towards more price-sensitive consumers. The first effect is large enough to generate
a substantial profit advantage caused by operating in a chain, however.
At the market level, our evidence is also informative on the debate over the causes of the
long term increase in markups observed by De Loecker et al. (2020) and others. It has been
widely speculated that this increase is caused by growing industry concentration as a result of lax
regulation. While we do not claim to rule out this explanation, our results show that simple models
producing positive relationships between concentration and markups are probably missing some
important aspects of how firms compete in many industries. This suggests that more industry-
level studies are needed where researchers can carefully account for differences in the nature of
competition and consumer demand and can study causal effects in a clear and credible way.
Finally, while our results are limited to a set of relatively small players unlike truly large retailers
like Amazon or Walmart, there is value in focusing on smaller firms for studying economies of scale.
First, we would expect larger effects as firms vary between 1 and 2 stores vs 100 and 101, and
generally if scale effects have decreasing returns it would be hard to replicate this type of study
for very large retail chains. Second, even in large and mature industries the debate on retail
concentration and retail mergers is often centered around cases with just 2 or 3 firms in a market,
such as the Staples and Office Depot merger. And third, outcomes for small firms and entrepreneurs
are often seen as especially important. Our results shed particular light on the value of scale to
small entrepreneurs and the role of luck in determining entrepreneurial outcomes. A cross-sectional
analysis of the entrepreneurs who entered this industry would find large differences in profits and
number of outlets and again might assume that higher quality entrepreneurs were able to run their
businesses more successfully and expand as a result, when the true causation in this case runs in
the opposite direction. Therefore barriers to scale, such as capital constraints, legal red-tape, etc
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are likely to be a significant impediment to entrepreneurial success if they keep firms too small.
Ultimately consumers may also benefit from a more concentrated retail sector with fewer but
larger firms. This is clear from the lower prices, larger assortments, and higher overall sales asso-
ciated with chain stores. Despite reducing competition, margins decrease rather than increase at
these stores. This suggests that barriers to scale, including Washington’s cap on the number of
licenses a firm can own, ultimately decrease the benefits of the retail sector for firms and consumers
alike.
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6 Data Appendix
6.1 Application Data
The list of businesses that have applied to licenses is available at the Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board website.14. This list of licenses is not cumulative as we noticed that some licenses
are dropped from the file through time. To recover the history of all license applications we use
the website wayback machine. It allows us to recover all the listings made available to the public
since the market opened. We use this procedure to recover the list of processors, producers, and
retailers that have ever applied to a license. In 22 instances, firms receive a new license number
but maintain their operation at the same location. We treat these cases as continuously operating
firms.
6.2 Transaction Data
We have two distinct data sets that are put together to form the final transactions data.
• Retail dispensing data: contains all transactions between retailers and consumers with times-
tamp, prices, quantity, product type, strain, and parentid. The parentid variable indicates
a 16 digit barcode identifier of the batch or lot the sample was taken from. It displays the
company making the sale but it does not have the exact license that was responsible for the
sale.
• Inventory transfers data: contains all transactions between the upstream and downstream
markets. Importantly, it displays the information at the license level. Other variables that
are included in this data are: strain, type, quantity, sale price, and parentid.
The parentid variable indicates a 16 digit barcode identifier of the batch or lot the sample was taken
from. This variable is also present in dispensing and allows us to match the datasets above.
6.3 Outliers
As with any administrative data, the data contains a small fraction of errors, misentries, and out-
liers. We systematically delete observations believed to be mis-entered into the BioTrack system.15
Namely, cases where the final sales price is below $3 per gram or above $80 per gram (0.8% of trans-
actions), wholesale prices below $1 or above $30 per gram ( .04% of transactions), weight below .5
grams or above 30 grams .07% of transactions) and markups above 3 ( .04% of transactions).16
6.4 Taxation
We check for whether retailers enter tax-inclusive or pre-tax prices into the dataset. This first
requires collecting sales tax rates for every store in every month because sales taxes may vary at
the 9-digit zip code level. We find the 9-digit zip code of each store and match each store to the
correct sales tax in each month of the data.
14https://data.lcb.wa.gov
15We follow the same procedure as Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019) for the removal of outliers and treatment of
taxes, described below.
16Legal purchase limits are one ounce for usable, 16 ounces for solid, 72 ounces for liquid, and 7 grams for
concentrates.
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Since the majority of final prices use integer units, we check for the share of integers generated
by each possible data entry rule. These rules include entering the pre-tax price, the price with
excise and sales taxes included, and the prices that include either excise or sales taxes alone. Then
at the retailer-month level we choose the rule that generates the highest share of integer prices, in
some cases we also compare pricing within a retailer-category from month to month and checking
final prices against the market average in each month to insure consistent treatment. We find
that prior to the tax change in July 2015, roughly 8% of retailers enter tax-exclusive prices, 60%
enter prices that include excise but not sales taxes, and 25% enter fully tax-inclusive prices. After
the tax law changes, over 90% of retailers enter tax-exclusive prices. Once we recover the rule at
the retailer-month level we construct the correct tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive prices for every
transaction.
6.5 Advertising
We acquired data on retailer advertising from Kantar Media, a firm that tracks advertising spending
across media. They have tracked advertising spending in the cannabis industry since before legal-
ization through the current time for the Seattle and Spokane markets, including outer suburbs. We
observe total spending at the monthly level for each media: outdoor, newspaper, magazines, tele-
vision, radio, and internet display. Advertising in this industry is heavily regulated and restricted,
and consequently there is relatively little of it.17
Table 12: Summary Statistics for Kantar Media Advertising Data
Ad Spending ($) Share
Media
Internet Display 2,094,816 11.5%
Local Magazines 52,922 .3%
Local Radio 404,485 2.2%
Newspapers 3,578,534 19.7%
Outdoor 12,028,456 66.2%
Total 18,159,213
Market
Seattle 16,996,795 93.5%
Spokane 1,162,418 6.4%
We use Kantar Media’s product description, which includes the store name, to match by hand
the advertising data to the main data. Table 12 provides summary information on firm advertising.
Almost all of it takes place in Seattle, broadly defined. Two thirds of all spending is on outdoor
billboards, followed by roughly 20% spent on newspaper ads.
17For instance, all advertising is prohibited “in any manner that would be especially appealing to children or other
persons under 21 years of age.” Advertising within 1000 feet of a school is also prohibited and all advertising must
include a variety of cautionary text. Outdoor billboard advertising is limited to providing the name and location of
a business.
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6.6 Co-branded and Former Medical Stores
The regulation WAC 314-55-155, from May 2016, regulated the advertising in the WA cannabis
industry. Among other rules, it allowed firms to have their own website where an “our story" tab is
usually found. This feature and the wayback machine digital archive allowed us to map the lottery
winners that had experience in the cannabis industry prior to the legalization as collective gardens.
We explore whether stores formerly operating as medical dispensaries prior to I-502 have different
likelihoods of being present in multi-store firms or whether including this as a covariate changes
any of our results. We find that former medical stores have lower sales and profits consistently,
even at the very beginning of the sample when they might have an advantage based on awareness
and reputation. No other results are effected by including this distinction.
The same data features made it possible to identify sets of stores that operate under the same
brand, which might encompass one or more firms. This is because their store locations were listed
on their websites. We find several instances of co-branded stores that are part of separate firms,
meaning they have separate owners and acquired their licenses through separately filed lottery
applications but at some point they chose to align themselves in their marketing. They either share
the same name or have a similar name and list all stores on a joint website.
An empirical concern in treating these as multi-store firms is that these arrangements may be
more likely to be entered into by higher quality managers or they may be more likely for stores
with prime locations. We therefore exclude co-branded but legally distinct sets of stores from our
definition of multi-store.
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7 Prominence and First Mover Effects
We run a test designed to help determine the mechanism behind our results from section 2. In
the introduction we laid out two theories for why larger firms would charge lower margins than
smaller firms. The first was that firms that offer more products attract a more price-sensitive set
of consumers (Rhodes (2015)). The second was that larger firms such as multi-store chains have
greater name recognition or awareness in a market and thus may be the first choice for consumers
searching for a specific product or low price. In this case, Armstrong et al. (2009) predicts that this
prominence gives these stores an incentive to charge lower prices to deter customers from searching
elsewhere.
In section 2, we have shown that multi-store firms do offer larger assortments and in section 3
we show they face different consumer demand. Here, we want to measure whether the effects of
being in a multi-store chain on prices is the result of higher prominence. To do so, we compare
the multi-store effect to the effects of prominence as defined by the first store to enter in a market.
Given the newness and novelty of this industry, the first store entering a market was likely to
generate a high degree of awareness among interested customers. This may generate a first mover
effect that acts similar to the proposed mechanism for multi-store firms.
Our results for prominence are displayed in Table 13. We test for a first mover prominence
effect causing lower prices in the overall sample in column 2. Compared to the result for multi-
store firms in column 1, we find no similar effect for first movers. We also test for effects in small
markets in columns 3 and 4. Small markets are defined as those for which fewer than 10 retailers
ever entered, and we speculate that a first mover effect would be stronger in these markets. Again,
we find a stronger result for multi-store firms in these markets but no effect for first entrants. In
columns 5 through 8 we repeat these tests for only the latter part of our sample, 2016 and 2017
and find similar results. A similar set of tests using variable profits as the dependent variable tell
a consistent story, with multi-store firms earning significantly higher profits but first movers seeing
no profit advantage in general, and significantly lower profits in small markets.
Altogether the, the lack of a first mover effect on prices provides evidence that multi-store firms
are not led to set lower prices as a result of greater prominence in the style of Armstrong et al.
(2009).
8 Robustness Tests
8.1 Robustness on Lottery
In this section we present a set of robustness checks for the primary results on variable profits. First,
we show in Table 14 tests regarding the random distribution of licenses via the lottery. Conditional
on filing a valid application, the result of the lottery is a uniform draw over all firms. Nevertheless,
sophisticated firms might have strategically chosen markets based on their beliefs about the number
of participants that would enter in each lottery. In this case, these firms would be more likely to
win multiple licenses, albeit in less desirable markets.
In Table 14 we show how our main results on profits across stores change if we include a set of
additional variables related to the lottery outcomes. Column 1 shows the baseline result. Column
2 shows results with a dummy indicator for lottery vs non-lottery licenses. Column 3 includes
city fixed effects and shows the effect of including the probability of wining as a covariate, where
probability of winning is calculated as the number of applications filed divided by the number of
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Table 13: Test of Prominence Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Markets: All Markets Small Markets All Markets Small Markets
Time Periods All All All All 2016-17 2016-17 2016-17 2016-17
Multi-Store -0.30*** -0.82*** -0.38*** -1.15***
(0.076) (0.223) (0.078) (0.238)
First Entrant -0.022 0.063 -0.063 0.062
(0.050) (0.086) (0.056) (0.092)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 251867 251867 97530 97530 207487 207487 79649 79649
R2 0.718 0.718 0.728 0.728 0.725 0.725 0.732 0.732
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of multi-store chain membership and first mover status on prices. In each column the
dependent variable is average retail price. First entrant a dummy that equals 1 for stores that were the first store to enter a
given city. The observation level is product-store-month. Small markets are defined as those in which fewer than 10 retailers
ever enter.
licenses available. Column 4 includes the number of applications at the market level directly. In
column (3) we observe that effectively expanding the market definition has little effects on store
profits. None of the other columns show a significant relationship between store profits and the
additional variables, and the effect of multi-store firm membership on store profits is effectively
unchanged.
Next we analyze whether the distribution of licenses allocated in the lottery is significantly
different from a random allocation. While the licenses were distributed according to random draws,
if firms were able to choose markets strategically there might be a non-random relationship between
number of applications and number of licenses won. We therefore test whether the joint distribution
of licenses is significantly different than what might occur if all licenses had the same win probability.
To do so, we calculate the expected number of licenses won if they were distributed from a poisson
process where all applications had an equal probability of winning a license. We use a poisson
parameter λ equal to the overall probability determined by the total number of applications and
licenses.
Table 15 shows the result of row-by-row chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for the joint distribution
of applications and licenses under the assumption of independent poisson draws. For 3 out of 4
rows we cannot reject the null of independent draws with p-values between .3 and .4. For the row
with 3 applications per firm, we do reject independent draws with p = .038. Essentially, among
firms that applied for 3 licenses too few won multiple licenses. Combining all rows, for the sample
as a whole we cannot reject independent draws, however.
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Table 14: Robustness Checks on Lottery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-Store 31799.4*** 31482.0*** 25535.8*** 33184.3***
(5512.789) (5576.544) (7400.843) (7369.916)
All Lottery 1179.4
(3106.230)
Pr(win) 117465.0***
(21485.698)
# Applications (Lottery) 29.9
(47.953)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Obs 3262 3262 2187 2187
R2 0.579 0.579 0.598 0.593
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable in each column is variable profits. Data sample period is April 2016 to
April 2017.
Table 15: Test of Independence: Distribution of Applications and Licenses
Approved
A
p
p
li
ed
1 2 3 χ2 p-value
1 117 0 0
2 60 10 0 1.80 .406
3 76 18 3 6.52 .038
4 26 8 0 .85 .357
5+ 23 10 3 .83 .362
Note: This table shows the joint distribution of applications filed and stores ultimately won in the 2014 retail lottery. We
calculate the expected number of licenses in each bin assuming all applications have an equal probability of winning and
calculate a chi-square goodness-of-fit test independently for each row.
8.2 Store Advertising
In this section we test whether the multi-store profit advantage is attributable to higher levels of
advertising spending. First, we compute monthly ad spending by each store type and find that
multi-store firms do not advertise more basis than single-store firms. Multi-store firms spend $540
per month on ads on average, with a median spending of $0 and a standard deviation of $3238.
Single-store firms spend $734 per month on ads on average, with a median spending of $0 and a
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standard deviation of $2849. The figures for multi-store firms are at the firm level since we cannot
separately measure advertising at the store level.
Table 16 shows the primary results for profits when advertising is included as a covariate. For
multi-store firms we show firm-level advertising and store-level advertising, calculated by dividing
the firm level amount by the number of stores. We also include log(adspendst + 1) due to the
highly skewed nature of the data. In Columns 2-4 of Table 16 we see that advertising is positively
correlated with variable profits, but including this covariate does not weaken the main effects.
Table 16: Robustness of Primary Outcomes to Advertising
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-Store 31799.4*** 32704.7*** 34067.7*** 37616.0***
(5512.789) (5411.957) (5404.094) (5354.251)
Firm Ad Spending 3.52***
(0.322)
Store Ad Spending 3.87***
(0.336)
log(Ad Spending) 5315.7***
(368.713)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3262 3262 3262 3262
R2 0.579 0.595 0.596 0.605
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable in each column is variable profits. Data sample period is April
2016 to April 2017.
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